Churchill the Warmonger started the bombing on cities first, David Irving i inni o Hitlerze i jego działaniach
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VIDEO, THE FHRER ON THE BLITZ. HITLER ALWAYS WANTED PEACE WITH BRITAIN.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rvsSDNcJO4o
DEUTSCHE BERSETZUNG UNTEN:
On 3 September 1939 the French and British empires had declared war on
Germany and UK's Royal Air Force began attacking German warships along
the German coast with the North Sea.
The attacks by the Royal Air Force (RAF) on German cities began with the
attack on Wilhelmshaven on 5 September 1939.
Eight months later, on 9 May 1940 began the German offensive in the West.
On 11 May the British Cabinet decided to unleash the Bomber Command on
the air war against the German hinterland. The following night British
planes aimlessly dropped bombs for the first time on residential areas of
Mnchengladbach-Rheydt. And from then on made such attacks on cities in
the Ruhr area night after night. Up to 13 May 1940, i.e. two days later,
the German side registered a total of 51 British air attacks on non-
military targets plus 14 attacks on military targets such as bridges,
railway tracks, defense and industrial plants.
The first carpet bombing of a German city was in the night from 15 to 16
May 1940 in Duisburg. After that the RAF committed repeated air attacks
on German cities.
The night of 24th August 1940 - bombs meant to be dropped on the
Thameshaven oil storage depot and on the Short's factory at Rochester, by
mistake or simply because they were randomly unloaded in order to escape
fighters, fell on the City of London and nine other districts inside the
Greater London limit. Incendiaries lit fires in Bethnal Green, and St
Giles' Church in Cripplegate was damaged. Oxford Street department stores
were damaged. Nine people were killed and 58 injured.
Am 25. August 1940 griffen britische Bomber nachts Berlin an, und zwar
nicht etwa, um gezielt kriegswichtige Ziele zu treffen - dazu war die
Royal Air Force (RAF) nicht in der Lage, weil man geeignete
Bombenzielgerte nicht entwickelt hatte.
On 6/7 September 1940, a German air raid on London took place - but
specifically on military targets such as ports, railway stations, war
factories and power stations. Crews were expressly prohibitted to drop
their bombs on residential areas because thereby "no war deciding success
could be reached."
***********************
Am 3. September 1939 hatten die franzsischen und britischen Imperien dem
Deutschen Reich den Krieg erklrt und die britische Royal Air Force
begann mit dem Angriff an deutsche Kriegsschiffe entlang der deutschen
Kste in der Nordsee.
Die Angriffe der Royal Air Force (RAF) auf deutsche Stdte begannen mit
dem Angriff auf Wilhelmshaven am 5. September 1939.
Acht Monate spter, am 9. Mai 1940, begann die deutsche Offensive im
Westen. Am 11. Mai beschlo¦ das britische Kabinett, dem Bomber Command
den Luftkrieg gegen das deutsche Hinterland freizugeben. In der
folgenden Nacht warfen britische Flugzeuge zum ersten Mal ungezielt
Bomben auf Wohngebiete von Mnchengladbach-Rheydt. Und von da an
erfolgten solche Angriffe auf Stdte im Ruhrgebiet Nacht fr Nacht. Bis
zum 13. Mai 1940, also innerhalb von nur zwei Tagen, registrierte die
deutsche Seite insgesamt 51 britische Luftangriffe auf nichtmilitrische
Ziele neben 14 Angriffen auf militrische Ziele wie Brcken, Bahnlinien,
Rstungsindustrie und Werkanlagen.
Das erste gro¦flchige Bombardement auf eine deutsche Gro¦stadt erfolgte
in der Nacht vom 15. auf den 16. Mai 1940 auf Duisburg. In der Folgezeit
flog die RAF wiederholt Angriffe auf deutsche Stdte.
Die Nacht vom 24. August 1940: Bomben fr den Thameshaven llager und fr
die Short-Fabrik in Rochester gedacht, aus Versehen oder weil die einfach
wahllos abgeworfen wurden um Jgern zu entkommen, fielen auf die City of
London und neun andere Bezirke innerhalb der Grenzen des Greater London.
Brandbomben znden Brnde in Bethnal Green an und die Gileskirche in
Cripplegate wurde beschdigt. Kaufhuser auf Oxfordstra¦e wurden
beschdigt. Neun Menschen wurden gettet und 58 verletzt.
Am 25. August 1940 griffen britische Bomber nachts Berlin an, und zwar
nicht etwa, um gezielt kriegswichtige Ziele zu treffen - dazu war die
Royal Air Force (RAF) nicht in der Lage, weil man geeignete
Bombenzielgerte nicht entwickelt hatte.
Am 6./7. September 1940 ein deutscher Luftangriff auf London erfolgte-
allerdings gezielt auf militrische Objekte wie Hafenanlagen, Bahnhfe,
Rstungswerke und Elektrizittswerke. Es war den Besatzungen
ausdrcklich verboten, ihre Bomben auf Wohngebiete abzuwerfen, da damit
"kein kriegsentscheidender Erfolg zu erwarten" sei.
The_Churchill_Centre_and_Museum@mail.vresp.com,
propagandaleiter(propagandaleiter@yahoo.com)
Institute for Historical Review
Defending Against the Allied Bombing Campaign: Air
Raid Shelters and Gas Protection in Germany, 1939-1945
Recently the argument has been advanced that each of the crematoria at Birkenau was equipped
with a gastight bomb shelter. The argument was first made in the summer of 1996 by Arthur R.
Butz, with respect to Crematoria II and III in his Vergasungskeller article.
In the spring
of 1997 the concept was extended to cover all of the crematoria in Birkenau in my article
"Technique and Operation of German Anti-Gas Shelters in World War Two" [hereinafter,
"Technique"].
Although the identification of these spaces as gastight bomb shelters was corroborated in
"Technique" by extensive reference to contemporary German civil defense literature, public
acceptance of the thesis has been slow. Part of the reason, no doubt, is that the "Bomb Shelter
note]
In addition we must recognize that the thesis, in either the Butz or Crowell variant, seems at
first glance both unusual and even extraordinary.
But the argument for bomb shelters in the Birkenau crematoria seems extraordinary only because
the scope of the German civil defense program is so little known. Hence, when the crematoria are
identified as having had gastight bomb shelters the first reaction of the skeptic will be, "Why would
there be alterations for the crematoria to serve as air raid shelters? Why not other buildings?,"
without recognizing that similar shelters were quite common in Germany, and, we believe it possible
to show, also in the concentration camp system and Auschwitz-Birkenau in particular. So it should
be clear that the argument for gastight bomb shelters in the Birkenau crematoria is strengthened to
the extent that analogous structures can be shown to have existed both in the concentration camp
system as well as in German cities.
The present article is an attempt to carry the argument for comparison and corroboration forward,
in this case by supplementing the contemporary civil defense literature cited in "Technique" with
secondary studies of German civil defense in the Second World War, comprising both recent
German studies as well as U.S. government studies prepared in the immediate postwar period. The
result will be the broader realization, widely recognized in the secondary literature, that gastight
bomb shelters were a common feature on the wartime German civilian and concentration camp
landscape.
We will begin by reviewing the rules and recommendations for German civil defense, and will find
that the precautions the Germans took for bomb and gas attacks were extensive. A review of the
actual types of structures will show a wide array of constructions, including adaptations of natural
geologic formations, existing structures for secondary bomb shelter use, covered trenches for
concentration camp internees, and a particular emphasis on aboveground structures, all of which
were designed to defend against both bombs and gas attacks. Provisions for gastight doors,
including those that would lock from the outside, reinforced concrete roofs, including those with
brick ventilation shafts, and gas-filtering ventilation systems will be shown to have been quite
common, according to both the documentary evidence and the oral testimony of the men, women,
and children who took part in the large civil defense network. In addition, we will note the particular
emphasis placed on chemical decontamination facilities, which would usually be sited in only a few
dual-purpose locations in a city, and which, along with the specially trained decontamination crews,
would also be used to combat vermin and the spread of infectious diseases, including typhus.
In the course of such a review we cannot pass by the opportunity to describe some of the
circumstances whereby the Germans used this civil defense apparatus to maximum advantage,
overcoming terror, destruction, and massive casualties to survive and endure. For if the story of the
civil defense precautions in the concentration camp system is little known, so too has the German
people's battle for survival in the Allied bombing campaign been largely ignored.
Civil Defense in Germany
Regulations
It was generally accepted after the First World War that aerial bombardment would be a feature of
any future war, and that civilian populations would be targets. "Strategic" bombing in this sense was
a kind of indirect warfare, meant to rupture the enemy's economy or demoralize its population so
that the enemy army would be forced to capitulate.
Such indirect warfare is a classic
feature of siege warfare as well as naval blockade. The last circumstance may explain why Great
Britain became the leading practitioner of strategic area bombing in the Second World War. A
famous expression of Britain's point of view was made by Stanley Baldwin in the House of
Commons on November 10, 1932:
I think it is well for the man in the street to realize that there is no power on earth that can protect
him from being bombed. Whatever people may tell him, the bomber will always get through. The
only defense is in offense, which means that you have to kill more women and children more quickly
than the enemy if you want to save yourselves. [H43f, S12] (See Key to Sources Used, p. 39.)
Recognizing such a position, Germany made attempts to protect itself passively from future air
attack in the 1920s, even though active defense -- searchlights, flak guns, and so on -- were
forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles. [S11] By 1931 the Ministry of the Interior was issuing
guidelines for civil defense, and in 1932 the first issue of the Vorläufige Ortsanweisung für den
Luftschutz der Zivilbevölkerung was issued, which by war's end would comprise twelve chapters
with numerous comprehensive attachments. [S12]
After Hitler took power Germany began preparing mobilization plans, and these included provision
for the defense of cities. The mobilization plans of the Luftwaffe included a special attachment
breaking down the cities of Germany into Civil Defense Areas (Luftschutz- orten) of Class I, II, and
III. [S14] The difference in classes was primarily a matter of local control, inspection, and
preparedness. The controls would be in the hands of the Luftschutzleiter (civil defense leader),
usually the mayor or sometimes the local Nazi gauleiter. The 104 cities in Class I (or LSO-I)
included all cities with large populations, and other cities that were considered vital for war
industries. Thus Hamburg, Berlin, Munich, and Dresden were naturally LSO-I: but so was Siegen,
with a population of 60,000. Siegen's inclusion was based on its location near the Ruhr, its status as
a garrison city, and its war-important industries.[S16]
It would be tedious to go over the voluminous regulations governing the civil defense establishment
in Germany from 1933 forwards, but there are two documents that deserve special attention: The
Code of Practice for Building Shelters [Bestimmungen für den Bau von Luftschutz Bunkern] and the
orders pertaining to the Luftschutz Führer Sofort Programm, that is, the Guidelines for the
Emergency Air Raid Program, usually referred to as the LS-Führerprogramm.
The United States, in its postwar surveys, stressed the detailed nature of the Code and its
provisions.[CD152f] In fact, the Code also laid down basic guidelines in which civil defense had to
be viewed. The basic concepts turned on the collective nature of the enterprise: any program was to
cover the whole city, and the program had to be worked into any urban development programs.
The Code gave preference to aboveground shelters, because underground shelters were costlier. In
addition, it specified various details, such as the number of gas locks for entry (preferably two), the
width of entries, the size of the staircases, the need for washrooms, first aid rooms, and so on.
[CD153]
If the Code underlay Germany's civil defense approach, the LS-Führerprogramm of November
1940 stressed the same points with greater detail and greater urgency. By the time of its issuance,
Germany was reconciled to a long air war; therefore the details of the program were meant to be
comprehensive and prescriptive, as a listing of some of its provisions shows:
1.
For buildings (municipal buildings, dwellings, lots) which up to now have either inadequate air
raid shelters, or none at all, do-it -yourself air raid measures will be adopted.
2.
Existing or newly constructed streets or transportation paths (e.g., subways and tunnels) are
to be adapted for the construction of underground and bombproof air raid shelters.
3.
The openings to the outside in existing air raid shelters are to be removed and at the same
time connections are to be made [to other shelters] with collapsible fire walls.
4.
New public air raid shelters are to be constructed, and existing air raid shelters are to be
made as bombproof as possible.
5.
All new constructions, particularly in buildings for the armaments industry, are henceforth to
be equipped with bombproof air raid shelters. Such shelters are to have the same priority as
the structure being built itself. [S23f, N327ff]
A few clarifications to the program are necessary. "The openings to the outside" that needed to be
closed has to do with the demonstrated insecurity of some emergency exits; this would lead
eventually to the filling in of emergency exit passages with sand, or boxes of gravel, or even the filling
in with a narrow wall. Second, the Brandmauerdurchbruch, or collapsible fire wall, was meant to
connect a series of buildings, such as one would find in large cities. Such an expedient would of
course be useless in situations where a building was isolated. The most striking thing about the LS-
Führerprogramm, aside from the extensive construction that followed after it was issued, is the fact
that it was global: all buildings, new or old, were to be equipped with bomb shelters.
Civil Defense in Cities
The organization for civil defense in Germany was extremely widespread. The Reichsluftschutzbund
(hereinafter, RLB)
numbered 12 million members by 1939 [B13], and it is only
reasonable to assume that its numbers swelled as the war continued. Each city had a complicated
hierarchy of positions and departments whose functions were clearly marked out.
The basic structure was the Sicherheits- und Hilfsdienst (SHD) (Security and Auxiliary Service),
which was further subdivided. The Sicherheitsdienst (S-Dienst) functioned as security and police in
the event of air raids, the Feuerlöschdienst (F-Dienst) were the firefighting crews, the
Instandsetzungsdienst (I-Dienst) were charged with technical and emergency repairs, including
bomb disposal and the rescue of bombing victims, and the Sanitätsdienst (San-Dienst) worked
closely with the Red Cross and the municipal health authorities in handling all problems of health,
emergency care, and hygiene that grew out of the bombing raids. There was even a special
department devoted to veterinary care, with emergency stations for the care of draft animals and
pets. [N46-143]
The final division of the civil defense forces was the Entgiftungsdienst, or Decontamination Service.
The decontamination workers were normally attached to the firefighters, and indeed in Nuremberg
they were amalgamated with the firefighters in 1940, so that the gas protection function of the E-
Dienst became auxiliary. [N77] By 1939, Nuremberg, with a population of about 450,000, had 15
decontamination squads with 15 NCOs and 300 men; in addition, there were 56 gas testers
(Gasspürer) attached to the central authority. [N48] The role of the gas testers was to follow up on
any suspicions of gas usage and take samples to one of 25 gas testing labs. Other fixed sites related
to the work of the Decontamination Service included five decontamination centers with 5 NCOs
and 20 men, and five centers for the decontamination of materials (Sachenentgiftungsanstalten), also
divided among 25 personnel. The location of these stations is difficult to establish today but it is
clear that they made use of existing locations that featured laundries and public bathing facilities.
[N78, CD164] It seems probable also that the municipal disinfection centers (several German cities
possessed these) were earmarked for dual purposes.
The example of the city of
Nuremberg can safely be extrapolated to Germany at large, not least because of the global nature of
the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey's report, which covers German gas protection measures in
detail.[CD164f]
The members of the Decontamination Service throughout Germany were issued special protective
clothing, including rubberized suits and boots, and, like other important personnel in the Civil
Defense Program, had higher quality gas masks (some 12 million gas masks in all were distributed).
[CD153,CD164] The U.S. Strategic Survey Final Report considered it significant that the
production of this anti-gas warfare gear continued until the end of the war.[CD164]
In addition, the members of the decontamination squads received special training: of the 150 hours
of instruction for these auxiliary firefighters, no less than 25-1/2 hours were devoted to chemical
warfare.[N78] On the other hand, in order to reduce anxiety, the average citizen received only
about a half hour of chemical warfare instruction. [CD165] In addition to the decontamination
squads, gas testers, the various fixed sites and their work crews, gas protection also included trucks
and even ships equipped with cleansing apparatus, and chemicals and decontamination equipment,
including trucks and supplies held in reserve to be sent to afflicted areas.[CD164f]
As to the application of gas protection features to air raid shelters, it was a given that bombproof
also meant gasproof, as one author remarks: "Particular attention had to be given to the entrances to
the bunkers. Each bunker had to have at least two entrances and each entrance had to be equipped
with a gas-lock. It was understood that bombproof meant proof against gas bombs!" [S40] The
U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey corroborates: "All buildings and public shelters constructed or
modified to house air-raid protection activities were gas proof." [CD164] Further evidence of the
pervasive nature of gas protection in Germany can be found in "Technique."
Shelters and Equipment
Secondary sources pertaining to the civil defense procedures of individual cities are a good source
of information on the types of shelters erected. But an extremely useful summary of such structures
can also be found in an essentially contemporary publication of the U.S. government, the Civil
Defense Division Final Report, issued in its second edition in January 1947.
The most basic shelter was the home shelter, or do-it -yourself shelter (Behelfmässige
Luftschutzraum), such as one would find in private homes or apartment buildings. Since some 22
million Germans lived in 58 cities of 100,000 or more [H128], and there were 104 cities with
priority civil defense classification (i.e., Luft-schutzort I) [S15], we can imagine that there must have
been literally hundreds of thousands of cellars that were fitted out with at least minimal bomb and
gas protection. Here, the numerous "how-to" articles in periodicals such as Gasschutz und
Luftschutz indicate the extent of the preparation. According to the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey,
such shelters were subject to inspection and approval by the local authorities [CD155] and had to
meet the following specifications:
1.
at least rudimentary gas-proofing,
2.
at least one emergency exit (usually to an adjoining cellar through a Brandmauerdurchbruch,
or collapsible fire wall),
3.
the sealing of all other openings to the outside, and
4.
in some cases rudimentary struts of wooden beams or brick. [CD155]
The costs of such private shelters were frequently subsidized by the government [CD155]: a wise
move, as during the heavy raids the line between private and public shelters was frequently erased.
As can be imagined such basic basement shelters provided only marginal support in the heaviest
raids, but the insistence on gas proofing is certainly significant in evaluating the importance and
pervasiveness of anti-gas measures.
A secondary category involved semi-public shelters, which included schools and other municipal
buildings. These were probably the most numerous of the various dual purpose shelters that served
a public function; the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey specifies that they were equipped with gastight
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